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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. , 
Case No. 
7701 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
COMMENTS ON RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT 
OF FACTS 
Respondent makes sweeping charges that appellant has 
misstated the record, and in doing so itself glaringly mis-
states the record. On page 3 of the opening brief, appellant 
stated that F. C. Paulsen's sole function as general manager 
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was the signing of leases for the Oregon Short Line Railroad 
Company. On page 5 of its brief respondent makes the fol-
folwing accusations. and statements: 
"* * * Counsel does not state the facts or 
the record properly. The evidence concerning Mr. 
Paulsen is that he is General Manager of the Union 
Pacific, as well as the Oregon Short Line, properties 
within the State of Utah and the designation as gen-
eral manager in and of itself would indicate that he 
would have such rights and duties as normally would 
be exercised by any general manager. Counsel for 
appellant attempted to infer by his questionings, of 
the witnesses that as general manager he had nothing 
to do, but the only testimony with respect thereto 
was that of Mr. Bachman, who stated with respect to 
his. duties, 'Primarily it is. to execute leases and con-
tracts on behalf of the corporate property, the corp-
orate company, the Short Line' (R. 87). This testi-
mony, in spite of what counsel made an attempt to 
infer from it, does not say that that was his 'sole 
function'.'' 
The record shows the respondent's charge to be ground-
less and his statements. to be entirely incorrect. On cross-
examination Lester C. Bachman, assistant to the President 
of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, testified as fol-
lows (R. 87-89) : 
"Q. What duties does he have as General Man-
ager of the Oregon Short Line ? 
"A. Primarily it is to execute leases. and con-
tracts on behalf of the corporate property, the corp-
orate company, the Short Line. 
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"Q. You sa.y, 'primarily,' does he have any oth-
er duties? 
''A. Those are the o·nes with which I am 
familiar. 
"Q. As Assistant to the President the only 
duties that you kno"'· that Mr. Pauls.en has. as General 
Manager of the Oregon Short Line is to execute leases 




"Q. What kind of contracts? 
"A. May I say leases. 
"Q. You strike out contracts? 
"A. Strike the contracts. There are some serv-
ice contracts that he can sign. 
"Q. Well, tell us what they are? 
"A. Contracts with draymen. 
"Q. With draymen? 
"A. For pickup and delivery service. 
"Q. What draymen? 
"A. Operators of trucks that handle our pickup 
and delivery services. 
"Q. What do you mean 'our'? 
"A. That is for the railroad company. 
"Q. Which railroad company? 
"A. Union Pacific. 
"Q. Oh! Well, I am asking you about the Ore-
gon Short Line. 
"A. Beg your parden. You have me a little con-
fused. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
"Q. You have me a little confused. Let us 
clear the record about these truckers and delivery-
men. You don't mean that the Oregon Short Line 
has any contracts with truckmen to haul and deliver 
anything? They don't deliver any freight, do they? 
''A. No. 
"Q. Well, what leases does Mr. Paulsen sign in 
behalf of the Oregon Short Line? 
"A. Leases to industries of sites on our Ore-
gon Short Line property." 
Counsel's statements on page 5 "that the rights, and: 
duties normally attributable to the office of general man-
ager would be exercised by Paulsen as General Manager 
of the Oregon Short Line," and that Paulsen's duties were 
primarily to execute leases. and the assertion that this was 
not his sole function are contrary to the undisputed evidence 
in the case. 
Counsel asserts that there are other officers and em-
ployees available for operation as a common carrier in 
Utah. What does. the record show? Bachman, testified as 
follows: 
(R. 89, 90.) 
"Q. What employees, other than Mr. Paulsen, 
does the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company have 
in the State of Utah. 
* * * * * 
(R. 90.) 
"A. I know of none. 
"Q. You know of none? Well, might there be 
any, do you suppose? 
"A. There could he. 
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"Q. But you don't know of them? 
"A. I don't know of them. 
* * * * * 
(R. 96.) 
"A. I know of no Officer that has ever been 
appointed to act in a corporate capacity for the 
Oregon Short Line in Utah except Mr. Paulsen. 
* * * * * (R. 96.) 
"Q. Does the Oregon Short Line have any 
trainmasters? 
"A. N o. 
"Q. Superintendents? Does it? 
"A. No. 
"Q. In Utah? And all of this is in Utah. Does 
it have any agents? 
* * * * * 
(R. 96, 97.) 
"Q. Are there any agents in the State of Utah 
for the Oregon Short Line Railroad? 
"A. Statutory agents? 
"Q. Any kind of agents? 
"A. Well, to the extent that we have Mr. Paul-
sen as an agent of the corporation. 
"Q. Do you know of any other? 
''A. I know of no others .. 
"Q. Any locomotive engineers? 
"A. I know of no locomotive engineers. 
"Q. Or firemen? 
"A. Or fireman. 
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"Q. Or brakemen? 
"A. Or brakemen. 
"Q. Or conductors,? 
"A. No." 
D. F. Wengert, Superintendent of the Union Pacific 
Railroad Company lines within the State of Utah, testified 
as follows: 
(R. 166.) 
"Q. And what is your employment? 
"A. General Superintendent, South Central 
District. 
"Q. For what company or companies.? 
"A. Union Pacific. 
* * * * * (R. 167.) 
"THE COURT·: I had one question, Mr. Wen-
gert. Is it of the Union Pacific or of these companies 
that you are General Superintendent? 
"A. I am General Superintendent of the Union 
Pacific for which I cover the properties of the OSL 
and the LA&SL from McCammon, Idaho to Los An-
geles, California." 
* * * * * (R. 178.) 
"Q. In your opening testimony, Mr. Wengert, 
you testified that you were employed by the Union 
Pacific Railroad? 
"A. Right. 
"Q. And not by the Oregon Short Line Rail-
road? 
"A. That's right. 
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"Q. And when you testified that you operated 
for the Union Pacific over the properties of the 
Oregon Short Line and the Los Angeles and Salt 
Lake did you mean anything more than train opera-
tions? 
"A. That is my jurisdiction, is train operation. 
"Q. Train operation? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. You didn't mean that you operate the 
properties of the Oregon Short Line in the sense 
that you leased them and collect rents or anything 
like that? 
"A. No sir." 
Again on page 6 respondent challenges the statement 
by appellant to the effect that the only employee of the 
Oregon Short Line within the State of Utah is F. C. Paul-
sen, and emphasizes that Arthur E. Stoddard is President, 
Ambrose J. Seitz Vice President and E. G. Smith Secretary. 
He might have added that George S. Eccles of Ogden, Utah, 
is a Director. Stoddard lives in Omaha, Nebraska; Seitz 
lives in Omaha, Nebraska; E. G. Smith lives in New York 
City (R. 101). As is shown under II this is hardly appropri-
ate personnel to operate trains and maintain trackage. 
Again on page 6 counsel charges appellant with attempt-
ing to confuse the issue of the case by asserting that the 
Oregon Short Line has not operated as a common carrier in 
any particular since January 1, 1936. The evidence shows 
without conflict that appellant's statement is entirely ac-
curate. 
The very trackage in question here was. built and paid 
for by the Union Pacific, not the Oregon Short Line. The 
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witness Gini, a Civil Engineer in the office of the Division 
Engineer of Union Pacific, testified as follows·: 
(R. 151, 152). 
"Q. Now Mr. Gini, do you know who built the 
track down to where it is now? 
"A. Well, the grading has been done by the 
Morrison-Knudsen contractors and the trackage was 
constructed by our own forces. 
"MR. VAN COTT : What does he mean by his 
'own forces'? 
"Q. First, I will ask-whose jurisdiction are 
the section men under in jobs of this nature? 
"A. The Division Engineer. 
"Q. Now what do you mean by 'our own forces' 
in constructing the track? 
"A. Well, forces has been employed by the 
Union Pacific to construct the tracks. 
"Q. And by that do you mean the section men? 
"A. Section extra gang, which is a section fore-
man usually in charge of an extra gang. 
* * * * * 
(R. 158, 159). 
"Q. Now you say that the fill for this industry 
lead was constructed by Morrison-Knudsen? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. They are contractors, aren't they? 
"A. y . es s1r. 
"Q. Did they enter into a contract with the 
Union Pacific for it? 
"A. Yes sir. 
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· 'Q. And the Union Pacific paid for it? 
"A. Yes sir." 
Exhibit "R" is the check in payment to the contractor 
who built the grade for this track. It is a check of the Union 
Pacific Railroad Company. 
Appellant on page 2 of its opening brief made the state-
ment that the lease from the Short Line to Union Pacific is 
for one hundred years. Mr. Miner at pretrial said it was 
(R. 19). He should have known. The lease is from year to 
year. However, reference to Union Pacific Unification, 189 
I. C. C. 359, will disclose that Union Pacific not only has 
precisely the same officers and directors as the Short Line, 
but also that it owns one hundred per cent of the capital 
stock of the Short Line. The Short Line, on page 3 of its 
brief, asserts that the Short Line could terminate the lease 
on three months' notice. Nevertheless it could not resume 
operation of the railroad at any time by giving notice as 
required by the lease. It would have to file an application 
with the I. C. C. permitting it to do so, and the I. C. C. 
would have to find that it was. in the public interest to do 
so, exactly the opposite of what it held in 189 I. C. C. 359. 
I. 
IN ORDER FOR A RAILROAD CORPORATION 
TO HAVE THE RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
UNDER THE UTAH STATUTE IT MUST BE A 
COMMON CARRIER. 
Appellant asserted in the opening brief P. 5 that the 
true meaning of Paragraph ( 4) of Section 104-61-1, U. C. 
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A. 1943, insofar as it relates to condemnation by railroads 
is "* * * railroads * * * for public transporta-
tion.'' This construction is conceded by respondent. On page 
23 respondent states: "A public use for which eminent 
domain may be exercised under that statute as. specified is 
'* * * railroads * * * for public transportation'." 
As asserted by appellant and conceded by respondent, 
therefore, power of eminent domain is given to "railroads 
for public transportation." "Public transportation" can 
mean nothing other than carriage as a common carrier. 
But respondent contends that the statute means that a 
corporation which is not a common carrier can nevertheless 
exercise the power of eminent domain if, after it acquires 
the property, it intends to lease it to another corporation that 
is a common carrier. It is submitted that this is a very 
strained construction, not justified by anything in the 
language of the statute and contrary to the philosophy of the 
law justifying constitutionally the delegation of the power 
of eminent domain, ·concededly one of the high attributes of 
sovereignty, only if the condemnor is engaged in the public 
service. It is not enough that the condemnor proposes. to be 
a landlord and lease the property to a common carrier. 
The Utah Constitution clearly contemplates that rail-
road companies are, within the meaning of the law, common 
carriers of passengers. and freight. On page 13 respondent 
quotes only so much of Section 12, Article XII as serves his 
purpose. The section in its entirety reads.: 
"All railroad and other transportation com-
panies are declared to be common carriers, and sub-
ject to legislative control; and such companies shall 
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receive and transport each other's passengers and 
freight, without discrimination or unnecessary de-
lay." 
The reference to railroad companies in the last clause 
clearly contemplates that they shall receive and transport 
passengers and freight. It is under this section that the 
Supreme Court of Utah held in Public Utilities Commission 
v. Nelson, 65 Utah 457, 238 P. 237, that the state may not 
by mere legislative fiat convert a private business into a 
public utility. So in the case at bar. Even if the legislature 
had by legislative fiat attempted to designate a corporation 
as a common carrier although it is not, has not and cannot 
operate as such, it would be unconstitutional. 
Respondent relies upon and quotes extensively from 
Elliott on Railroads. That author justifies the delegation of 
this attribute of sovereignty upon the ground that a rail-
road corporation is a public utility. Elliott on Railroads, 
Second Edition, Volume 2, Section 954, reads. as follows.: 
"Since railroads are regarded as of public util-
ity, the delegation to a railroad corporation of the 
power to take, by proceedings in invitum, the neces-
sary lands upon which to build its road, is upheld by 
all the courts.'' 
None of the cases cited by respondent hold that the 
power of eminent domain may be exercised by a corporation 
which is not a common carrier. 
In Whitman v. Northern Central Railway Company, 
cited by respondent on page 13 of its brief, the only question 
was whether the Northern Central Railway Company could 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
issue capital stock to pay for improvement and maintenance 
of its property. The question was concededly controlled by 
the meaning of the Transportation Act of 1920 which defined 
a common carrier by railroad to mean "-any corporation 
organized for the purpose of engaging in transportation by 
railroad subject to this act." Obviously the Northern Cen-
tral Railway Company was, "organized for the purpose of 
engaging in transportation by railroad" and according to 
the Maryland court was still so engaged. On page 115 the 
Maryland court stated: 
"* * * But we think that contention in-
volves too narrow a construction of the word 'car-
rier'; for while the lessee does perform the actual 
work of transportation over the leased system of rail-
roads, the lessor still has important duties and func-
tions to· perform in connection with that transportar 
tion in which the public has a v~tal and immediate 
interest amd whick are nec-essarily predicated up()n 
and assume its continued status as a carrier. * * * 
It was originally chartered as a carrier, it was organ-
ized as a carrier, until the lease referred to, it oper-
ated a railroad system as a carrier, it is st~ll requirred 
to discharge many duties as a carrier, it is now 
organized to act as a carrier, and in the event of de-
fault on the part of its lessee it must again actively 
operate its railroad system as a carrier. Under those 
circumstances, it remains now, as it originally was, 
a common carrier'' (Italics added) . 
None of the things relied upon by the Maryland court 
as constituting the Northern Central Railway Company a 
common carrier is true of the Oregon Short Line. To be sure 
it was, originally organized as a carrier and was a carrier 
until January 1, 1936. It is not required to discharge any 
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duties as a carrier now and in fact does not discharge any 
duties as a carrier and could not do so unless and until it 
secured a certificate from the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion and the Public Service Commission certifying that it 
was in the public interest for the Short Line to operate 
separately from the Union Pacific. 
On page 15 respondent relies. on North Carolirna Rail-
road Compan;y v. Zachary from the Supreme Court of the 
United States, arising under the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act. Respondent's statement of this case fails to show 
the basis of the court's decision, which was that inasmuch 
as the lessor, under the North Carolina law, was responsible 
for all acts of negligence of its lessee, therefore the injured 
employee had a direct right of action against the lessor 
corporation. On page 254 the court said : 
"* * * Under the local law, as. laid down in 
Logan v. Railroad, 116 Nor. Car. 940, the lessor is 
responsible for all acts of negligence of its lessee oc-
curring in the conduct of business upon the lessor's 
road; and this upon the ground that a railroad corp-
oration cannot evade its public duty and responsibil-
ity 'by leasing its road to another corporation, in the 
absence of a statute expressly exempting it. The 
responsibility is held to extend to employees of the 
lessee, injured through the negligence of the latter. 
* * * * * 
"The court based its decision that the Federal 
act did not apply, in part upon the ground that the 
North Carolina Railroad is not an interstate rail-
road-its tracks and property lying wholly within 
the State-and that the corporation itself is not, al-
though its lessee is, engaged in interstate commerce; 
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the lessor's activities being confined to receiving an-
nual rents and distributing them among ts stock-
holders. * * * 
* * * * * 
"* * * This being the legal situation under 
the local law, it seems to us that it must and does 
result, in the case before us, that the lessor is a 'com-
mon carrier by railroad engaging in commerce be-
tween the States,' and that the deceased was 'employ-
ed by such carrier in such commerce,' within the 
meaning of the Federal act; provided, of course, he 
was employed by the lessee in such commerce at the 
time he was killed." 
It is difficult to see how Lake Superior & Mississippi 
Railroad Company v. United States, cited on page 17 of 
respondent's brief, is in point. Congress, in making a land 
grant to railroads, provided that the United States should 
have free use of the railroad as a public highway. The 
court held, in view of the history of railroads, that this 
meant the roadbed and railroad track alone and did not in-
clude transportation. The case does not hold that a railroad 
corporation not engaged as a common carrier is entitled to be 
regarded in any way as if it were a common carrier. 
United States v. Union Stockyards· Company, cited by 
respondent on page 19 merely holds that a belt stockyards 
railroad operator was within the Safety Appliance Act and 
liable for transporting a car in violation of that act. The 
defendant was an actual operator of a railroad, held itself 
out as such and collected regularly established rates there-
for. 
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The weakness of respondent's contention in this re-
gard is well exemplified by its going outside the record 
and discussing the operations of the American Express 
Company. This company files tariffs and schedules for its 
operations with the I. C. C. and the P. S. C. U. It maintains 
offices in various cities of the United States, including 
Salt Lake City, where it receives shipments to be moved 
by railway and air transportation. It is true that it does 
not itself operate railways and airways but that, of course, 
is of no importance in view of its other elements. 
Denver R. L. & C. Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, cited by respondent on page 24, arose on plaintiff's 
motion to strike from defendant's answer. On page 387 
the court said : 
"* * * The third answer is that 'the defend-
ant, further answering, respeetfully shows. to the 
court and alleges that the said company was organ-
ized and is a private corporation for the purpose of 
constructing and operating a railroad from certain 
coal lands owned, as alleged by the petition, to Den-
ver, and for the purpose of hauling its coal from 
said lands to the city of Denver, as private enter-
prise, and not for the accommodation of the public in 
any way or manner whatever.' This answer appears 
to be intended to present the question that the road 
built by the petitioner is a private road, and not for 
public use. It is, however, rather indistinctly stated. 
The averment is that the company was organized 
for this purpose, and as a private corporation, with-
out a distinct statement as to what the road will be 
if built. The inquiry is not as to what the company 
was organized for, or whether it will be a private or 
public corporation, but what the road will be,-the 
structure itself,-if any such thing shall be made." 
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This case me·rely supports appellant's contention that the 
true character of an alleged railroad company must be de-
termined from its actual characteristics and not by what 
it was organized for. 
Respondent seems to concede the authority of In Re 
Niagara Fa.lls Whirlpool Railw'(J;y Company, 108 N. Y. 37'5, 
15 N. E. 429. Respondent relies upon its authority on pages 
28, 29 and 35 and. quotes from it on pages 28 and 29. Both 
the appellant and respondent rely on the case although 
they differ as to its significance in the case at bar. ,Clearly 
it holds that whether or not a railroad corporation can 
exercise. the power of eminent domain is not to be deter-
mined by what its articles of incorporation recite. The 
court said: 
"* * * Looking at the articles of association 
alone, it appears that the company is a railroad cor-
poration organized under the general railroad act 
for 'public use in transporting persons and property' 
by a railroad to be constructed between certain ter-
mini. The papers., on their face, show that the cor-
poration has undertaken an ordinary railroad enter-
prise within the purview of the act of 1850, in aid 
of which the power of eminent domain may be ap-
propriately exercised. But, when we look beyond the 
formal documents, and the actual business proposed 
to be conducted is considered, we find that the pro-
posed railroad has no proper termini; that it is not 
a highway in any just or proper sense; that it can-
not, by reason of necessary limitations, perform one 
part of the duty it has undertaken, viz., the trans-
portation of freight; that, at most, it can be oper-
ated but a portion of the year; and that the sole 
object of its construction is to enable the corporation, 
for a compensation to be received, to provide for the 
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portion of the public who may visit Niagara Falls 
better opportunities for seeing the natural attrac-
tions of the locality. We feel constrained to say 
that, in our judgment, this is not a public purpose 
which justifies the exercise of the high prerogative 
of sovereignty invoked in aid of this enterprise. The 
right of the company being challenged on this 
ground, the court is compelled to consider it, and 
it is manifest that the inquiry is not precluded be-
cause the petitioner has organized itself under the 
general railroad act, and has assumed in its· articles 
of association the charac·ter of an ordinary railroad 
corporation. * * *" 
Respondent concedes this to be the law. On page 35 
of its brief the respondent says : 
"* * * and we admit, and will reiterate, as 
was true in the case of Niagara Falls Whirlpool Ry. 
Co., if the use proposed is not a public· use, nothing 
contained in the articles or charter of a company can 
aid the corporation in taking the property sought." 
This concedes not only that the proposed use must be 
public, but that in coming to that conclusion the actual 
business to be conducted by the putative condemnor must 
be scrutinized, and that the activities of the putative con-
demnor must be those of a common carrier? That is pre-
cisely what the Niagara case holds. That is elementary and 
completely settled, so much so that it is not much discussed 
in the cases Ia tter ly. 
In reasoning about the case at bar one is apt to become 
confused by the circumstance that the Short Line was for 
many years a common carrier, unquestionably with the right 
of eminent domain and that it is closely linked to the Union 
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Pacific, which now is a common carrier and undoubtedly 
has the power of eminent domain. This gives the Short 
Line something of a railroadlike flavor and aroma. Y-et it 
is clear and even conceded by respondent that the situation 
is no different than as if the Oregon Short Line had been 
organized in 1950 and was now seeking to condemn a right 
of way not for its own building of a railroad, not for its 
own operation of a railroad, but solely for the purpose of 
leasing it to another common carrier. 
The case is no different than this. supposition case. 
Suppose that a railroad called the XYZ Railway Company 
projects a railroad between two points in Utah to run 
through a narrow canyon, indispensable to the line unless 
very expensive tunneling is resorted to. An individual 
sensed this difficulty and sought to buy from the owner 
the only economical, natural right of way through that can-
yon. The owner refused to sell. The individual then created 
a Utah corporation, named it the Salt Lake Short Line. 
To give it something of a railroad flavor it named Stoddard 
of Omaha as President, Seitz of Omaha as Vice President, 
Smith of New York as Secretary and Paulsen of Salt Lake 
as General Manager, with the sole purpose of signing the 
lease, and Eccles of Ogden as a director. 'This Short Line 
also filed no tariffs, had no trains to carry passengers or 
freight, had no train crew and had no present intention of 
ever doing any of the things which characterize a common 
carrier. 
Would anyone have the temerity to contend that the 
Salt Lake Short Line could do this? Yes, that is precisely 
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what respondent contends in the case at bar. That is pre-
cisely 'vhat the Short Line in the case at bar is attempting 
to do. It is merely a prospective and potential landlord as 
to the property sought to be condemned. 
The Niagara case is square authority against the Salt 
Lake Short Line. Delegation of the power of eminent do-
main to such a corporation would be clearly unconstitution-
al. In the N~~agara Fa.Zls case, 15 N. E. 429, the court said 
on page 431: 
'' * * * Soon after the passage of the general 
railroad act of 1850, the question was raised as to 
the validity of the act in so far as it attempted to 
confer upon any corporation which might thereafter 
be created under its provisions the power to de-
termine when and what private property might be 
compulsorily taken for the purposes of its road, and 
it was held that the act was a constitutional delega-
tion of the power of eminent domain. Railroad Co. 
v. Braz"ruLrd, 9 N. Y. 100. The expediency of this 
legislation has been questioned. In the infancy of 
railroad enterprises there was little danger that rail-
roads would be projected, not required by public 
necessity, or where the public interests would not be 
subserved by their construction; but the plan of per-
mitting any persons who might deem it for their 
interest to do so, to unite and organize a railroad 
corporation and to fix the route, subject practically 
to no supervision or control by any public authority, 
and to invade and take private property for the pur-
poses of the road wherever the company should see 
fit to locate it, is attended with some unquestionable 
evils.. It is probably true that many speculative rail-
road enterprises have been initiated and carried on 
under this liberal legislation, which would not have 
been authorized if a special charter in each instance 
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had been required, or if the power of determining as 
to the necessity of the road had been lodged with 
some disinterested public body. The right of the state 
to authorize the condemnation of private property 
for the construction of railroads, and to delegate the 
power to take proceedings for that purpose to rail-
road corporations, has become an accepted doctrine 
of constitutional law, and is not open to debate. But 
the power is. dormant until the legislature authorizes 
its exercise; and the particular corporation which 
claims the right to exercise the power must be able 
to show a legislative warrant, and, that being shown, 
it must be able, further, to establish, if the right is 
challenged, that the particular scheme in which it is 
engaged is a railroad enterprise within the true 
meaning of the decisions which justify the taking 
of private property for railroad purposes; or that 
the business which it is organized to carry on is 
public; and that the taking of private property for 
the purposes of the corporation is a taking for public 
use." 
The case of Railroad Company v. Brainard, 9 N. Y. 
100, referred to in the Niagara case, as cited in 185'3, justi-
fied constitutionality of the delegation of the power of emi-
nent domain to a railroad corporation upon the ground 
that it was a delegation to a common carrier of property 
and passengers (although the statute merely called them 
railroad corporations) and that, therefore, the interest of 
the public and of the railroad were sufficiently identical. 
On page 108 the court said : 
"It is very evident from the whole scope of the 
act under consideration that the Legislature designed 
to make these corporations common carriers of per-
sons and property, and to require them to be con-
stantly engaged in such public employn1ent (Story 
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on Bailments, §§ 495, 496) ; and it was decided as 
long ago as 1837, in the case of Bloodgood v. The 
Moha.wk a.nd Hudson River Ra.ilroad Company (18 
Wend. 9), in the court of last resort in this State, 
that lands taken for the construction of such a road 
were taken for public use. 
* * * * * 
"But the particular ground of objection relied 
upon to show that the act in question is unconstitu-
tional, if I correctly understand it, is that the act 
itself does not appropriate the specific land taken 
for public use, but delegates to the corporation the 
power in each particular case to make the location 
and selection. 
* * * * * 
"The objection raised to the validity of this act 
is certainly of a very grave character, and I have 
found much difficulty in answering it satisfactorily 
to my own mind. I am, however, after the best con-
sideration which I have been able to bestow upon the 
subject, of opinion that this act is not invalid for the 
reasons stated. The Legislature has the undoubted 
authority to provide for the incorporation of rail-
road companies by a general act (Const., art. 8, § 1), 
and it may by legislative enactment give to them 
powers, and impose duties almost exclusively of a 
public character and in such cases it may without 
doubt lawfully declare that all lands taken for the 
construction of their roads shall be deemed taken for 
public use." 
In the Brainard case the New Yiork Court of Appeals 
referred to the decision by the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts in the case of The Boston Water-Power Co. v. The 
Boston & Worcester R. R. Co., 23 Pick. 360. That case the 
Supreme Judicial ·Court of Massachusetts gave considera-
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tion to whether the delegation of power of eminent domain 
to a railroad corporation was constitutional and its reason-
ing is based upon the fact that the railroad in question was 
being built for use by the condemnor as a common carrier. 
On page 395 the, court said: 
"* * * In the present case we think that the 
interests of the corporation and those of the public, 
were so nearly coincident, it being plainly for the 
advantage of both that the shortest, s~afest and cheap-
est route should be chosen, that the power might be 
safely intrusted to a corporation thus constituted. 
This mode of exercising the right of eminent do-
main, is warranted by numerous precedents, both 
in our own ,Commonwealth and in most of the other 
States of the Union." 
One hundred years after those decisions it has, some-
times been lost sight of, as by the respondent in the case 
at bar, that constitutional delegation of power of eminent 
domain to a railroad corporation is upheld because the 
railroad corporation is engaged in the public service of 
carrying passengers and freight and, therefore, the public 
interest would probably be protected. So construed, private 
ownership of property in the suppositious case and in the 
case at bar would be protected against the taking of property 
for use merely by a landlord or lessor. 
II. 
THE OREGON SHORT LINE IS NOT A COM-
MON CARRIER. 
Respondent's contention that the Short Line is, a com-
mon carrier reduces itself to an absurdity. The Short Line 
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has not had any tariffs on file either with the Public Service 
Commission of Utah or the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion since January 1, 1936 (R. 129). If it undertook to per-
form any service as a common carrier it would violate the 
laws both of the State of Utah and of the United States and 
be subject to criminal penalties. 
Section 76-3-2, ppg. (1), U. C. A. 1943, provides. in part 
as follows: 
"Every common carrier shall file with the com-
mission, and shall print and keep open to public in-
spection, schedules showing the rates, fares, charges 
and classifications for the transportation between 
termini within this state of persons and property 
from each point upon its route to all other points 
upon any route owned, leased, operated or controlled 
by it, and from each point on its route or upon any 
route leased, operated or controlled by it to all points, 
upon the route of any other common carrier when-
ever a through route and a joint rate shall have been 
established or ordered between any two such 
points." 
Section 76-6-25, ppgs. ( 1) and (2), provides as follows: 
" ( 1) Any public utility which violates or fails 
to comply with any provision of the constitution of 
this state or this title, or which fails, omits o~ 
neglects to obey, observe or comply with any order, 
decision, decree, rule, direction, demand or require-
ment, or any part or provision thereof, of the com-
mission, in a case in which a penalty has not here-
inbefore been provided for such public utility, is 
subject to a penalty of not less than $500 nor more 
than $2,000 for each and every offense. 
" ( 2) -Every violation of the provisions of this 
title or of any order, decision, decree, rule, direction, 
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demand or requirement, or any part or prov1s1on 
thereof, of the commission, by any corporation or 
person is a separate and distinct offense, and, in case 
of a continuing violation, each day's continuance 
thereof shall be a separate and distinct offense." 
49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 6, ppg. ( 1) provides as follows: 
"Every common carrier subject to the provisions 
of this, chapter shall file with the commission created 
by this. chapter and print and keep open to public 
inspection schedules showing all the rates, fares, 
and charges. for transportation between different 
points on its own route and between points on its 
own route and points on the route of any other car-
rier by railroad, by pipe line, or by water when a 
through route and joint rate have been established." 
49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 6, ppg. (7) provides in part as fol-
lows: 
"No carrier, unless otherwise provided by this 
chapter, shall engage or participate in the transport-
ation of passengers or property, as defined in this 
chapter, unless, the rates, fares and charges upon 
which the same are transported by said carrier have 
been filed and published in accordance with the pro-
visions of this chapter." 
49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 6, ppg. (1), provides as follows: 
"In case of failure or refusal on the part of any 
carrier, receiver, or trustee to comply with the terms 
of any regulation adopted and promulgated or any 
order made by the commission under the provisions 
of this section, such carrier, receiver, or trustee shall 
be 'liable to a penalty of $500 for each such offense, 
and $25 for each and every day of the continuance 
of such offense, which shall accrue to the United 
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States and may be recovered in a civil action brought 
by the United States." 
Rules to govern the Construction and Filing of Freight-
Rate Publications were revised and promulgated by the I. 
C. C. in Tariff Circular No. 20 effective Oct. 1, 1928 and 
supplemented by the I. C. C. effective Dec. 1, 1937. Respond-
ent has no tariffs filed in conformity thereto (R. 129). 
The Short Line has not carried either freight or pass-
engers since January 1, 1936 (R. 85, 90, 96, 97, Ex. C). If 
it attempted to do so it would violate the laws of Utah and the 
United States. 
Moreover, the Short Line has no employees such as are 
necessary to operate as a common carrier (R. 90, 96, 97). It 
has no engineers, firemen, conductors, brakemen, train-
masters, etc., etc. (R. 90, 96, 97, 166, 167). 
Respondent on pages 5 and 6 emphasizes that it not only 
has a General Manager, Mr. Paulsen, in the State of Utah, 
but that it also has other officers, to wit, Arthur E. Stod-
dard, President; Ambrose J. Seitz, Vice-President; E. G. 
Smith, Secretary. In addition it might be mentioned that 
it also has George S. Eccles in Ogden, Utah, as a Director. 
Seitz, Stoddard and Smith occasional'ly come to Utah, al-
though they live elsewhere. Would it be possible for these 
five men to operate a freight or passenger train? Would 
Paulsen be the engineer, Stoddard the fireman, Seitz a brake-
man, Smith a brakeman, and Eccles conductor? If they did 
so and carried either a passenger or as much as a pound 
of freight, they would be guilty of unlawful acts under the 
laws of Utah and the United States. 
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A common carrier must maintain its railroad. Would 
Eccles be roadmaster; Smith section foreman; Paulsen, 
Stoddard and Seitz section laborers? The latter are some-
what old and infirm for the assignment. 
On page 10 of its brief respondent makes a concession 
which destroys its contention that it is a common carrier. 
It says: 
"We wil'l agree that neither a ·corporation nor an 
individual can be either in law or in fact a common 
carrier unless such corporation or individual holds 
itself or himself out to the public as being willing to 
undertake for hire to transport persons or com-
modities generally for the entire public, or has been 
so engaged in transporting and holding out to trans-
port for the public generally." 
The Utah Statute and United States Statute say what 
must be done to hold oneself out as a common carrier. Re--
spondent has not done so. The Short Line's concession 
destroys its contention. 
Despite all of the squirming by respondent, the record 
shows without any contradiction that the Oregon Short 
Line, since January 1, 1936, has. not operated in any partic-
ular as a common carrier. It has operated no trains what-
ever, it has carried no passengers or freight whatever, it 
has not published any tariffs setting forth its rates for car-
riage as a ·Common carrier, it has had no personnel available 
for the operation of trains and the carriage of freight or 
passengers, it has· had no personnel available for the con-
struction or maintenance of any railroad trackage. Respond-
ent cannot escape from the undisputed record which clearly 
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demonstrates that the Oregon Short L~ine is not and has 
not been and could not be since January 1, 1936, engaged 
in any particular whatever as a common carrier. 
III. 
RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT IT· ·CAN 
CONDEMN EVEN THOUGH IT HA8 LEASED 
ITS PROPERTY TO THE UNION PACIFIC IS 
ITS OWN MAN OF STRAW. 
In Section 4, pages 43 to 63, respondent creates a man 
of straw and attempts to destroy it by contending that even 
though it has leased all of its property to the Union Pa-
cific it can nevertheless condemn. Respondent admits. that 
this question is posed by the respondent and not by the ap-
pellant. In spite of the fact that the appellant has not sug-
gested the question, counsel contends that it is the principal 
point in issue. Appellant has never contended that a rail-
road corporation which leases its property is thereby auto-
matically prohibited from condemnation. Appellant's con-
tention is that the Short Line is not a common carrier and 
therefore cannot condemn property. Appellant so stated 
at pretrial \Vhen respondent first cited these cases. At R. 
20 counsel for appellant made the following statement: 
"MR. VAN COTT': Well, I haven't had a chance 
to read these cases. Of course I will, but so far as 
anything he read is concerned it didn't get to the 
point we have because there is nothing to show in 
any one of those cases that those plaintiffs in the 
condemnation proceedings were not common carriers 
for hire. They could well have leased their property 
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and remain common carriers. I will read the cases 
and analyze them and give the ~court the benefit of 
my views when that question comes up at the trial. 
"But in this State even if a statute, we will say 
a statute undertook to give a corporation the power 
of eminent domain and that corporation was not a 
public use, was not a common carrier, as long as we 
are dealing with railroads, it would be unconstitu-
tional. Even the legislature cannot. give the power 
of eminent domain to a. person or a corporation 
which is not engaged in public service except in cer-
tain isolated examples. We have a lot of authority 
on this subject in this State without going outside of 
it." 
It might have leased its property and yet be a common 
carrier by holding itself out as such for the carriage of 
passengers and freight pursuant to tariffs filed with the 
I. c .. C. and the P. S. :c. U. as does the Railway Express 
Company. None of the cases cited by .counsel on this point 
holds that a railroad company can condemn property even 
though it is not a common carrier nor does any case in re-
spondent's brief so hold. 
IV. 
APPELLANT'S ST'ATEMENT OF POIN'TS 
CLEARLY DISCLOSES THAT APPELLANT 
CONTENDED THAT THE PURPOSE OF CON-
DEMNATION MUST BE PUBLIC. 
On pages 31 and 32 respondent argues that no attack 
was made by appellant in its State1nent of Points upon 
which appellant will rely upon Finding No. 22 and Con-
clusion No. 3 and that therefore appellant cannot argue or 
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contend before this Court that the purpose for which re-
spondent seeks to condemn is not a public purpose. This 
misconceives the entire nature of the Statement of Points 
upon which appellant will rely provided for in Rule 75, 
paragraph (d). This rule states that no assignment of 
errors is necessary. Moreover, no statement of points is 
necessary unless the appellant does not designate for in-
clusion the complete record. If a statement of points is 
necessary, it is only necessary to inform the respondents 
of the contentions to be made, so that the respondent may 
form his opinion as to what portions of the record should 
be included. Appellant's statement of points· fully advised 
respondent of the contention which appellant has made in 
this record. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the statement it is 
clearly set up that appellant will contend that the respon-
dent is not engaged in the rendition of any public service. 
On page 31 respondent states that appellant did not 
request that there be included in the record any evidence 
given by public witnesses owning property in the area in-
volved to the effect that they needed trackage, wanted track-
age, and requested trackage. That evidence has nothing 
whatever to do with the contention made by appellant in 
this record. Appellant's contention is that the Short Line 
is not a common carrier and that therefore the purpose is 
not public. It is entirely immaterial whether individual 
members of the public wants this spur built or not, so far 
as appellant's contention is concerned. Everybody in Salt 
Lake County might desire to have Sears Roebuck build an 
addition on its building. That would not make it a public 
purpose. Everybody in Salt Lake County might desire to 
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have landlord Oregon Short Line Railroad Company con-
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